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Posts Tagged ‘Fort St. John family law’

Kelowna, Vancouver, Surrey, Fort St John Spousal Support Lawyers and Spousal Alimony Guidelines 2011 Update

Monday, May 30th, 2011

Vancouver Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, Maintenance and Alimony Lawyers


The BC spousal support and alimony lawyers at the MacLean Family Law Group want divorcing BC spouses to be aware of the most recent maintenance law in British Columbia concerning spousal support and spousal alimony cases and we look forward to meeting you at any of our four spousal support law office locations in Vancouver, Surrey, Kelowna, or Fort St. John British Columbia. Call us toll free 1-877-602-9900 as delay may prejudice your case. You cannot afford to ignore the issue or be in the dark about your spousal support rights.

As you may or may not be aware, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG), although advisory only, and as such are not binding on B.C. courts have come to be routinely applied by our Courts. (This is in contrast to the child support guidelines which have been legislated.) B.C. Courts are applying SSAG more and more regularly when deciding the duration and quantum appropriate for spousal support. Recently in Domirti v. Domirti 2010 BCCA 472, the Court of Appeal adhered strictly to the guidelines, overturning a chamber judge’s award of indefinite support following a 16 year marriage, finding that, according to the guidelines a duration of between 8 and 16 years would be appropriate. The Court of Appeal found the chambers judge had erred in applying the guidelines, and stated that “to maintain spousal support within the range for the amount of support but ignore the range for the duration of the award is effectively to make an award contrary to SSAG.”

Under SSAG, the “Rule of 65” indicates that if the age of the spouse entitled to receive support, when added to the length of the marriage, is equal or greater than 65, the appropriate duration of the support payments may be “indefinite.” The Court of Appeal in Domirti cautions that it must be the age of the spouse at the date of separation, and not the age at the date of review, and notes this calculation mistake was made by the chambers judge resulting in an inappropriate award. Although under the Rule of 65, as well as for marriages of 20 years or more, the guidelines indicate that “indefinite” awards may be appropriate, it is important to be aware that indefinite does not mean permanent! While there will be situations where life-long maintenance of a former spouse is appropriate, there will also be situations where it is not.

Despite being applied with increasing frequency, there remain times when strict compliance with the guidelines is not appropriate, as was the case in Munro v. Munro, 2006 BCSC 1758. Although the marriage in this case lasted for 18 years, it was not found to be a traditional marriage, as both parties worked throughout the majority of the marriage. Brine J. found that “that it is not, in the circumstance of this case, appropriate to apply the Advisory Guidelines.” After taking into consideration factors such as “the limited or no economic disadvantage to the defendant from the marriage, the defendant’s delay in pursuing her obligation to become economically self-sufficient, and the reapportionment of debt and assets in the defendant’s favor,” Brine J. found it appropriate to award an amount outside of the guideline recommendations.

In conclusion, at this point the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines are more than just suggestions but less than strict law. The key point being that the guidelines are not awarded unless entitlement can be shown, however the guidelines themselves that use a “Robin Hood” type formula that uses income differentials to create a range of monthly payment sums can in themselves cause a finding of entitlement that may not at law truly be justified. They are used regularly by courts, and as demonstrated in Domirti, can be confusing to apply. If you are receiving or paying spousal support, and have not already done so, it is in your best interest to speak with a lawyer well versed in applying the guidelines, who will also be equipped to recognize when and where exceptions to the general guidelines are appropriate.

Langley Divorce Lawyer, Surrey Family Law and Surrey Family Lawyer Advice and Vancouver and Fort St John Family Law Lawyers- Best Practices

Friday, May 6th, 2011

Christy Clark and Lorne MacLean Langley divorce lawyer and Surrey Family lawyer at the MacLean Law Group's Fort St John BC law office


All too often Surrey BC Family Lawyers, Langley BC family and divorce lawyers and Surrey family law lawyers and their Surrey BC separated or divorcing Langley BC family law clients can lose sight of the need for respect and civility in their Greater Vancouver and Langley, Delta and Surrey BC family law case. A Langley BC divorce, Surrey family law child custody, Vancouver spousal support, or Fort St John BC property division and family asset case is already stressful enough without rude conduct that inflames the BC family law situation and prevents a prompt BC divorce settlement. Here is a list of Vancouver BC Family Law Best Practices that will be presented for approval at the June Provincial Council meeting of the CBA BC. We as Vancouver, Surrey and Fort St John family lawyers wholly agree with these practices and I tell my clients there is a difference between being rude and firm.

BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR LAWYERS PRACTICING FAMILY LAW

Lawyers involved in a family law dispute should strive to ensure it is conducted in the following manner:
1. Lawyers should conduct themselves in a manner that is constructive, respectful and seeks to minimize conflict and should encourage their clients to do likewise.
2. Lawyers should strive to remain objective at all times, and not to over-identify with their clients or be unduly influenced by the emotions of the moment.
3. Lawyers should avoid using inflammatory language in spoken or written communications, and should encourage their clients to do likewise.
4. Lawyers should caution their clients about the limited relevance of allegations or evidence of conduct.
5. Lawyers should avoid actions that have the sole or predominant purpose of hindering, delaying or bullying an opposing party, and should encourage their clients to do likewise.
6. Lawyers cannot participate in, and should caution their clients against, any actions that are dishonest, misleading or undertaken for an improper purpose.
7. Lawyers should keep their clients advised of, and encourage their clients to consider, at all stages of the dispute:

a. the risks and costs of any proposed actions or communications;
b. both short and long term consequences;
c. the consequences for any children involved; and
d. the importance of court orders or agreements.

8. Lawyers should advise their clients that their clients are in a position of trust in relation to their children, and that
a. it is important for the client to put the children’s interests before their own; and b. failing to do so may have a significant impact on both the children’s well-being and the
client’s case.
9. Lawyers should advise their clients of and encourage them to consider, at all stages of the dispute, all available and suitable resources for resolving the dispute, in or out of court.

1 Lawyers are not obliged to assist persons who are being disrespectful or abusive.

New BC Family Relations Act Definition of BC Spouse Changes BC Common Law Spousal Support and BC Property Rights for BC Unmarried Persons

Wednesday, October 13th, 2010

MacLean Discusses Changes to Common Law Rights with BC AG Lawyers


If you are a BC unmarried person in a BC common law- also called a BC marriage-like relationship- the rules of the game for British Columbia spousal support and for BC property division are about to radically change. The definition of “spouse” that controls the rights you have to spousal support have been expanded due to the following change in wording to the definition:
“spouse” means a person who
(a) is married to another person,
(b) lived with another person:
(i) in a marriage-like relationship for a continuous period of at least 2 years, or
(ii) in a marriage-like relationship of some permanence if the persons are together the parents of a child

and, for the purposes of this Act, the marriage-like relationship may be between persons of the same gender.

This wording change means spousal support may be payable if a child is born of the relationship and the relationship is of some permanence (no one is sure what this means yet!) as opposed to the current requirement that you must have lived together continuously for more than 2 years. Can a one night stand where a child is born be of some permanence or is 30 days enough or what will it it take to meet this new test?

Similarly, although the Supreme Court of Canada has said BC common law couples should not be treated the same as married persons, the British Columbia government has decided to treat common law couples who meet this new definition of “spouse” the same for purposes of property division. To make matters even more confusing the British Columbia government has decided to change the rules of the game for married persons as well. To find out what these new rules are for property division, go to our article on the new changes by clicking here.

New BC Child Custody Moving Away Rules Coming-BC Child Relocation and BC Child Mobility

Sunday, October 10th, 2010

What is the test for moving away in a child custody case in BC? As BC Family Law and child custody and access lawyers in Vancouver and Fort St. John, BC one of the most heart wrenching family and BC child custody cases we see occurs when one parent wants to, or is required to, move away with the child from the other parent. Our past articles have discussed the current rules for child relocation also known as child mobility. The BC government has issued a new Family Relations Act Reform White Paper that establishes notice provisions to allow parties to agree to the move or failing that to give each party time to deal with the issue in the courts. The new proposals also contain factors to be considered and onus provisions that differ with the level of child raising involvement of both parents.

The Divorce Act and legislation in Alberta and Saskatchewan allow for orders that establish parenting arrangements to also include provisions requiring notice of a proposed move of a child. Saskatchewan’s Children’s Law Act, 1997,106 and the Divorce Act107 require 30 days notice while Alberta’s Family Law Act108 requires 60 days notice. A notice period of less than 60 days was considered an insufficient period of time for cooperative discussions to take place and 60 days was seen as sufficient time to prepare for a hearing if settlement was not possible.
The second prong of the proposed policy is to include a child-centred definition of relocation that takes into account the specific circumstances of individual families. A child-centred definition of relocation that focuses on the impact of the proposed move on the child’s primary relationships avoids the potential arbitrariness of distinctions drawn on threshold distances, travel times or borders.
The third prong is to legislate specific factors that a judge must and must not consider and introduce the following presumptions:
 Where the day-to-day care of the child is not equal or substantially equal, the initial burden is on the guardian who wants to move with the child to show that the proposed move is in good faith and that reasonable efforts have been made to find ways to preserve the relationship with the other guardian(s) and with others who are significant to the child. If this initial burden is met, then the onus shifts to the other guardian to prove that the proposed move is not in the child’s best interests.
 Where the day-to-day care of the child is equal or substantially equal, the burden is on the guardian who wants to move with the child to show that the proposed move is in good faith and is in the child’s best interests.
106 SK Children’s Law Act, 1997, Above Note 33, s. 6(6). 107 CAN Divorce Act, Above Note 2, s. 16(7). 108 AB Family Law Act, Above Note 32, s. 33(2).
71White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform 2010
When assessing good faith, it is proposed that judges be directed to consider: the reasons for the move; the likelihood it would enhance the general quality of life of the child and the guardian proposing the move, including improved financial, emotional or educational opportunities; and any existing restrictions on relocation in an order or agreement. However, judges would be prohibited from considering whether a guardian proposing a move with a child would relocate without the child in any event.
If a judge grants an order in favour of relocation, he or she may also order reasonable security (e.g., posting of a bond) to ensure the relocating guardian complies with orders designed to preserve the relationship between the child and the other guardian(s) or people significant to the child.
The granting of a relocation application will likely necessitate a change in the parenting arrangements for a child, like parenting time schedules. The proposed new Act allows a judge to make those changes needed to facilitate the new reality without the need to establish a change in circumstance. However, the judge will be limited to making changes only insofar as needed to accommodate the move and is directed to preserve the existing parenting arrangements to the greatest extent possible. This responds to the criticism that relocation applications may evolve into an unintended re-examination of the entire parenting arrangement. The concern is that previous agreements or court orders regarding which guardian is best to exercise particular responsibilities should not be re-examined simply because the residence of one of the adults and the child is to be different.
On the flip side, if the judge does not grant the request for a relocation order, the proposed move is not to be considered a material change of circumstance that would alone justify a change to existing parenting arrangements.

BC PARENTAL ALIENATION LAWYER -SHOULD THE CHILDREN SUFFERING FROM PARENTAL ALIENATION BE MADE TO VISIT THE TARGET PARENT?

Friday, October 1st, 2010

Lorne MacLean BC Child Custody Lawyer Celebrates Julie's 25th Anniversary at his Firm


All professionals involved in child custody cases agree it is important to involve a lawyer familiar with parental alienation syndrome, one judge to manage the case and a psychological expert with specialized knowledge as early in the process of a suspected case of Parental Alienation Syndrome as is possible. We handle a number of these cases and are familiar with the warning signs and the types of alienators that may exist whether it be a naive alienator or an active alienator and whether the PAS is mild moderate or severe and what other hypotheses need to be explored such as estrangement or enmeshment.
One thing you will learn very rapidly is that there are a variety of opinions on this contentious issue from one side who says PAS does not exist to the other end of the spectrum where experts say it exists in the majority of cases!

Call Lorne MacLean at 1-877-602-9900 to get an objective opinion on whether your case involves Parental Alienation Syndrome.

CURRENT CONTROVERSIES REGARDING PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME
Richard A. Warshak, Ph.D.
SHOULD CHILDREN BE FORCED TO SPEND TIME WITH THE TARGET PARENT?

By far the most controversial issue in the PAS literature is the recommendation of enforced access between children and their alienated parents and reduction of access between the children and the parent promulgating the alienation.

In the majority of cases of moderate PAS, Gardner recommends that the court award primary custody to the alienating parent, appoint a therapist for the family, and enforce the child’s contact with the target parent through the threat and imposition (if necessary) of sanctions applied to the alienating parent (33). Such sanctions are similar to those the court would use against a parent who is in contempt for failure to pay court-ordered alimony or child support. The sanctions include a continuum from requiring the posting of a bond, fines, community service, probation, house arrest, to short-term incarceration. Some states grant courts the power to suspend a contemnor’s driver’s license or order public service duty. Turkat notes that the absence of such sanctions has allowed parents to interfere with visitation and flaunt court orders with impunity (86).

The goals of therapy with children suffering from moderate PAS are to foster healthy contact with the target parent and to assist children in developing and maintaining differentiated views of their parents as opposed to polarized views of one parent as all good and the other as all bad. One way to get children involved with the rejected parent is to take the decision about contact out of the children’s hands, reminding them of the possible sanctions against the preferred parent for resisting court-ordered contact, and thereby giving them an excuse to spend time with the target. The therapist also tries to help the children appreciate that their animosity has been influenced by programming which has undermined their ability to reach conclusions on the basis of their own direct experiences with the target. Some authors compare this aspect of treatment with the “deprogramming” that is used with cult victims to help counteract the effects of indoctrination (29, 33).

In some cases of moderate PAS, when the parent is more intensively programming the children and there is a high risk of the alienation becoming more severe, Gardner recommends a different legal approach. In such cases he recommends that courts consider awarding primary custody to the alienated parent and extremely restricted contact between the alienating parent and child, in order to prevent further indoctrination. Similarly, in the most severe cases of PAS (which, in Gardner’s experience, comprise about 5-10 percent of all PAS cases), Gardner recommends that the court remove the children from the home of the alienating parent.

Because children with severe PAS will not generally comply with court orders, and the programming parent cannot be relied upon to facilitate contact with the target parent, and because courts are reluctant to place children with a parent they appear frightened of, Gardner recommends temporary placement of the children in a transitional site before reintegrating the children in the home of the target parent. Possible transitional sites range from least restrictive to most restrictive, depending on the amount of control necessary to ensure the children’s cooperation and the alienating parent’s compliance with court orders. Such sites include the home of a relative or friend, a foster home, a community shelter, or a hospital. Gardner makes a good case for the transitional program, but he has had little direct experience with it, mainly due to courts’ general hesitance to implement it (3). Rand, however, describes some success with it (2).

In addition to serving as transitional sites, the threat of temporary placement in a foster home, community shelter, or juvenile detention center may induce children to cooperate with court-ordered visitation. With older children (ages 11-16) who refuse visits with the alienated parent, Gardner suggests the possibility of finding the child in contempt of court (4). This recommendation has met with the most opposition.

One author who objects to enforced visitation argued that a contempt finding for a child who refuses visitation is strictly punitive in nature and counterproductive (87). The concern is that such actions will reinforce the child’s hatred of the alienated parent. Instead, this author recommends that the court examine why a child resists contact with a parent and rely on family counseling and supervised visitation as a first step in repairing the child’s relationship with the alienated parent: “Instead of punishing them for their feelings, we need to work with them to help them understand the value of a relationship with their parent” (87; p. 95). Gardner, on the other hand, warns against unnecessary indulging of children’s visitation refusal (3). He believes that the best way to reverse alienation is to provide a child with direct experiences which can counteract negative programming and correct the child’s distorted perceptions of the target parent.

One problem with supervised visitation is the message it can send to a child: It can suggest that the child’s fears of the target parent are rational and that the court agrees that the child needs some sort of protection from the alienated parent. Thus, rather than increase the child’s security around that parent, it may reinforce the child’s uneasiness. The AC model makes a similar point (25).

The importance of separating the child from the alienating parent, and ensuring the child’s exposure to the target parent, is consistent with treatment methods for victims of brainwashing, including prisoners of war and members of cults. Clawar and Rivlin report on the similarities between the methods used by cult leaders to control their followers and the manipulations of alienating parents (29). Brainwashing scholars have identified the victim’s dependence on the programmer and isolation from the target as critical conditions for successful indoctrination. These conditions must be removed for effective deprogramming to take place.

The results of the ABA-sponsored study support a firmer approach to enforcing parent-child contact. The study reported, “One of the most powerful tools the courts have is the threat and implementation of environmental modification. Of the approximately four hundred cases we have seen where the courts have increased the contact with the target parent (and in half of these, over the objection of the children), there has been positive change in 90 percent of the relationships between the child and the target parent, including the elimination or reduction of many social-psychological, educational, and physical problems that the child presented prior to the modification” (29; p. 150).

Gardner’s recent follow-up study of 99 children diagnosed with PAS found a strong association between environmental modification and reduction in PAS symptoms (76). In 22 instances, the alienated child’s contact with the rejected parent was increased and contact with the alienating parent was decreased. In all 22 cases, PAS symptoms were reduced or eliminated. By contrast, only 9% of the children (7 out of 77) whose contact with the rejected parent was not increased by the court, showed a reduction in PAS symptoms. This study also provides a beginning understanding of the factors that lead alienated children to initiate their own reconciliation with the rejected parent. Further study along these lines may assist decision-makers in determining which children might not require environmental modification in order to recover from PAS. The large sample and the statistical test of significance allowed by this size sample make this an important study. Nevertheless, its limitations must be noted, chiefly that the children were not interviewed, the only informant for the follow-up was the rejected parent, and the interviews were conducted by a clinician who had formulated the hypothesis being tested.

Other treatment approaches to severe PAS have been reported in the clinical literature, but in general such approaches have met with failure. Dunne and Hedrick published a clinical study of 16 severe PAS cases (41). The court ordered a custody change and/or strict limitation of contact between the alienating parent and the children in only three of these cases. In all three cases PAS was eliminated. The other 13 cases were treated with various, less restrictive interventions, ranging from individual or conjoint therapy for the parents, therapy for the children with either the alienating parent or target parent, or the assignment of a Guardian Ad Litem. In none of these cases was the PAS eliminated. Two cases showed “some” or “minimal” improvement, nine showed no improvement, and two were worse after the interventions.

This study has significant limitations. The sample size is small. Details are not provided about the methods used to analyze clinical case material. As is typical in clinical research with small samples, no statistical analyses were conducted to document that the findings were not due to chance. Nevertheless, the 100% correspondence between elimination of severe PAS and transfer of custody does provide some evidence in support of this intervention.

Lampel analyzed clinical case studies on 18 families, out of which seven children were described as rejecting a father who had no objectively noted parental dysfunction (48). Such children could be classified as moderately to severely alienated. The therapists conceptualized the children’s rejection of the father as a phobia with hysterical features and tried two different approaches commonly used to treat phobias.

The first approach, used with six children, included individual therapy sessions with the child followed by gradually increasing times with the father both in and out of the therapist’s office. Sessions were also held for the mother, both individually and jointly with the child, for the father, and for both parents and child jointly. This approach is similar to Gardner’s recommended treatment for moderate PAS cases.

The second approach, used with one child, is similar to Gardner’s recommendation for severe PAS. The child was placed with the father for six to eight weeks while the therapist provided individual therapy sessions for the child and parents, and joint sessions with the child and father. This child was the only one of the seven children whose symptoms reduced markedly. The children whose treatment did not include placement with the rejected father experienced results varying from minor improvement to deterioration. In three cases the treatment was regarded as a clear failure. Lampel attributed the failures to the mothers’ “collusive involvement” with their children. Again, although this is a very small sample, the results support the effectiveness of placing the child with the alienated parent.

Naturally, treatment approaches to PAS will benefit from more and higher quality research. Given the limitations in the available studies, some might dismiss the current professional literature as too inadequate to serve as an authoritative guide to decisions for alienated children. But no study is free of limitations. The issue is whether the limitations render the study useless. The peer review process, though no guarantee of a study’s lasting value, is designed to weed out studies whose flaws outweigh their contributions.

Courts and clinicians face decisions about alienated children on a daily basis. These decisions can draw on the best available information, while duly noting its limitations, and thereby benefit from the experience of the families reflected in the published reports. Or the decisions can ignore this information. At this point in time, all the published findings on treatment outcomes support the effectiveness of enforcing contact between the child and alienated parent and no findings oppose this policy. When all available studies point to the same conclusion, it makes sense to pay attention to that conclusion, while allowing for the possibility that the circumstances of any single case may dictate an alternative treatment approach. Indeed, an emerging consensus among mental health professionals supports the idea that “court orders for continued contact are the cornerstone for treatment” of PAS cases (30; p. 309). Similarly, Stahl refers to “general agreement” that recommendations should include “forced consistent time between the child and the alienated parent” (88; p. 6).

But no consensus has been reached on the proposal for courts to consider a transfer of custody (as opposed to enforced contact) in severe PAS cases. Some have expressed the concern that alienated children are ill-equipped to cope with the change in custody, and that they could be seriously harmed (23). Although this possibility must be entertained, if this were a likely outcome, one would expect to see reports in the professional literature; to date there is no published documentation of such harm. Some allegations that harm has resulted from custody transfer may actually be misrepresentations promulgated by embittered litigants. Nevertheless, some clinicians advise parents of severely alienated children to accept the loss of their children while maintaining hope for future reconciliation (88).

Based on their ABA-sponsored study, Clawar and Rivlin conclude, “Caution must be exercised in judging that the point of no return has been reached. We have seen numerous cases where children have been successfully deprogrammed by making radical changes in their living arrangements—often with appropriate legal interventions” (29; p. 144). As they explain it, “There are risks incumbent in any process; however, a decision has to be made as to what is the greater risk. It is usually more damaging socially, psychologically, educationally, and/or physically for children to maintain beliefs, values, thoughts, and behaviors that disconnect them from one of their parents (or from telling the truth, as in a criminal case) compared to getting rid of the distortions or false statements” [emphasis in the original] (29; p. 141).

BC CHILD CUSTODY AND ACCESS TIPS-HOW TO PROMOTE A HEALTHY POST CHILD AND PARENT OUTCOME-MAXIMUM CONTACT

Wednesday, September 22nd, 2010


10 WAYS TO HELP YOUR CHILDREN DURING DIVORCE
1. Show your children that you still love them.
Spend time with them; show them affection; be ready and willing to listen when they want to share their feelings with you.
2. Encourage your children to respect and love their other parent.
Give your children permission to love their other parent. Don’t talk negatively about your ex to your children. Share positive memories of your married life.
3. Don’t burden your children with adult problems.
Although your children may have to assume extra responsibilities around the house after the divorce, never forget that they aren’t adults yet. Be careful not to burden them with your financial or emotional worries – this is too scary for them. Assure them that no matter what, everything will be okay.
4. Try to agree with your ex on the basics.
If you and your former spouse are sharing custody, try to agree on curfews, disciplines, and grades. However, if you decide on different rules, don’t complain about it to your children or argue with your spouse unless his/her parenting style is clearly doing emotional or physical harm to your children.
5. Make your children feel at home in your new place.
Allow children to help you decorate and create a space that is all their own within your new home. Maintain a supply of toiletries, clothes, and toys at each residence.
6. Avoid manipulation.
Avoid arguing with your former spouse in front of your children, using your children as go-betweens if you are fighting with your ex, or trying to prevent your ex from seeing your children.
7. Keep your promises.
Keeping agreed upon visits and/or phone call times will help children feel their lives are more predictable. Give as much notice as possible if you need to change your plans.
8. Wait to date.
Avoid bringing home dates before or right after your divorce is final. Wait until you are dating someone regularly to introduce them to your children because children can become emotionally attached to new parent figures and suffer if the relationships end.
9. Make your children’s lives stable and predictable.
Maintain as many routines, rules, and traditions as you can. Serve meals at the same time, do homework at the same time, maintain the same standards for discipline.
10. Avoid the “Super Parent” syndrome.
If you feel guilty about the effect of the divorce on the children or competitive with their other parent, don’t try to compensate for these feelings by lavishing the children with gifts, trips, money or by becoming over-protective.
AFCC

Key Canadian Tax Decision Allows Deduction of Divorce and Family Law Legal Fees Related to BC Child Support

Monday, June 14th, 2010

Lorne MacLean -New Tax Deduction for Legal Fees to Claim BC Child Support

A new Tax Court ruling affecting BC child support legal fee deduction could help you save thousands provided your BC family law counsel is aware of this important development. Come see The BC child support lawyers at MacLean Family Law Group to learn more about how this important ruling affects you. In short a new case has expanded the class of people able to deduct legal fees to claim BC child support.

If you are seeking child support from you former spouse you are entitled to a CRA tax deduction of those legal fees against your income tax payable thanks to Trignani v. The Queen [2010] TCC 209.

In this case, the separating parent’s August 2000 agreement stipulated joint custody for the child and the appellant was to pay child support of $350/month. In May 2001 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ordered that the appellant would have sole interim custody of the child with the spouse having interim access 50 percent of the time with supervision. And, the appellant was to continue to pay $350/month in child support.

For the majority of the time the appellant had physical custody of the child because appropriate supervision at the spouse’s residence was not available.

The Honourable Justice Judith Woods in her decision dated April 9, 2010 notes that as long as the person seeking, or pursuing child support against the other parent does not abandon their claim for child support before the relevant legal services were provided; and, that it has not been determined by a court that you do not have a pre-existing right to child support because that right was extinguished by a court order, then you are entitled to the deduction in computing your income.

It has generally been accepted that legal expenses incurred to obtain child support are deductible in computing income: Wakeman v. The Queen, [1996] 3 CTC 2585; McColl v. The Queen, 2000 DTC 2148; Sabour v. The Queen, [2002] 1 CTC 2585 (in obiter at para 9); and Rabb v. The Queen, [2006] 3 CTC 2266. This principle is also accepted by the Canada Revenue Agency, as evidenced by Interpretation Bulletin IT-99R5, at para 17.

With respect to child support, legal expenses have been considered to be on current account on the basis that there is a pre-existing right by virtue of a legislative obligation on each parent to support their children.

A note of caution must be raised: The person seeking child support or pursuing a claim for child support must be making a bona fide claim that is not frivolous, and must have a reasonable prospect of success. You will also need to have your lawyer keep track what portion of fees related to child custody and get a letter from them that sets out the correct amount.

BC Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines-SSAG- BC Support Success Story for MacLean Family Law Group-Pre Tax Profits Used For High Support

Sunday, June 13th, 2010

Lorne MacLean Vancouver BC spousal support guideline award and SSAG spousal support guidelines lawyer


Lorne MacLean BC SSAG support and spousal support guidelines lawyer, using the with child support spousal support advisory guideline formula, recently succeeded in obtaining a lucrative BC Spousal Support Advisory guideline ” SSAG” and BC child support guidelines award on behalf of his client, the wife, in a complex and high net worth BC spousal support guidelines and BC child support guidelines proceeding where a BC child support award of $8771 retroactive for 13 months (plus private school and extracurricular fess of roughly $3000 monthly) and a BC spousal support advisory guidelines award of $17714 was ordered meaning the combined monthly payments of spousal support advisory guidelines support and child support approached $30,000 per month. The award ranks as one of the highest court BC spousal support awards in BC since the SSAG spousal support calculations came into effect. Mr. MacLean succeeded in having the court use all of the companies pre-tax profits for the SSAG calculation based on BCCA law from the cases of Klukas and Teja, defeating the husband’s spousal support claim that double dipping applied to BC spousal support and a lower BC spousal and BC child support payment should thus be paid, blocking any $350,000 cap argument where BC spousal support is not increased on high salaries above $350,000 per year and finally in having the child support portion of the order made retroactive so a large lump sum payment was received for the children’s benefit. We were delighted to have achieved such a generous BC spousal support and BC child support result for our BC family law client.

For privacy reasons the case is referred to as A.R.J. v. Z.S.J. [2009] B.C.J. No. 2393, B.C.S.C. The brief facts are:
-Married for 16 years.
-Two children.
-Husband, a surgeon, was sole director and equal shareholder in his professional services corporation.
-A personal services corporation unlike a company involved in a riskier or more capital intensive maunufacturing business, generally speaking, does not require significant injections of capital in order to operate.
-Citing our Appellate case authority Mr Justice Savage determined that in the absence of legitimate calls on the pre-tax corporate income of a company, children and a spouse are entitled to support based on the full income available to the payor spouse.
-The double-dipping argument was rejected as it was the income earning capacity of the payor that gave rise to the assets in the company and this argument was not valid.
-No $350,000 cap would be used for the husband’s income which would have drastically lowered the wife’s support.

We look forward to helping high net worth spouses involved in complex family law cases.

A Happy Client gives Lorne MacLean a Great Birthday Cake

International Child Custody Wrongful Removal Law and BC Child Custody Abduction and Hague

Tuesday, June 8th, 2010

On the final day of the AFCC Conference, Mary Damianakis, MPA, MSW spoke about this growing field. Ms. Damianakis is a leading international mediator for these cases and has extensive experience in this unique area. Surprisingly, given the nature of child abduction cases, some jurisdictions require a mandatory mediation prior to the hearing of a return petition under the Hague Convention. This does appear to be a growing area of mediation however as many families are now multi-jurisdictional, with both the parents and children having two or more passports for their countries of birth, citizenship and residence.

Few mediators are equipped to deal with many of the issues that can arise with an international custody agreement. Beyond the normal issues of custody and access, international custody cases also have to address serious issues such as determination of jurisdiction, conflict of laws, registration of consent orders, dealing with both countries that have ascribed to the Hague convention and countries that have not, arrangements for access and methods for enforcement and/or incentives for the return of a child after access has occurred. These can be very complicated agreements and require someone with training and experience in international law.

Ultimately however as with any agreement, international custody agreements are only enforceable so long as the parties are committed to adhering to them. An agreement executed in BC for custody and access has little or no weight in a foreign country in terms of enforcing the return of a child to BC. This is particularly so with respect to countries that have not ratified the Hague Convention. Of the close to 300 countries that there are in the world, only approximately 80 have agreed to abide by the Hague Convention and some of those countries have done so with specific reservations, meaning that there are exceptions as to when or how they will enforce the Convention when it comes to returning a child.

If you have an international custody situation, contact Lorne MacLean at MacLean Family Law Group to discuss your unique situation. While international child abduction cannot be stopped, there are steps that you can take to help prevent the chances your child being abducted.

MacLean Family Law Group
Suite 3103-1077 West Cordova Street
Vancouver, BC, V6C 2C6
Telephone: (604) 602-9000 Ex. 224
Fax: (604) 682-0556

BC Law on Varying or Setting Aside Unfair BC Separation Agreements or BC Marriage Agreements 2010 Update

Sunday, April 25th, 2010

We are often asked to review BC separation agreement or BC marriage agreements with a view to setting the BC separation or BC Marriage agreement aside and Shelagh Kinney of our BC Family Law office had a nice win recently in a case on behalf of the wife in L v. L, a BC Supreme Court separation agreement variation 2010 decision.

Our Supreme Court in the Brandsema decision warned spouses that fair agreements made with full disclosure between spouses on an equal footing will be protected but unfair exploitive agreements will not be sanctioned. In Brandsema the Court focussed on non-disclosure by the husband and varied the agreement to give the wife more money on the following basis:

Abella J., speaking for the majority, stated (at paras. 1–6):

“This court has frequently recognized that negotiations following the disintegration of a spousal relationship take place in a uniquely difficult context. The reality of this singularly emotional negotiating environment means that special care must be taken to ensure that, to the extent possible, the assets of the former relationship are distributed through negotiations that are free from informational and psychological exploitation.

…

This appeal, therefore, attracts a spotlight to the duties owed by separating spouses during the process of negotiating and executing a separation agreement for the division of matrimonial assets. In Miglin, based on the inherent vulnerability of spouses during negotiations, this Court stated that in order to safeguard a separation agreement from judicial intervention, a spouse must refrain from using exploitative tactics. It held that the failure to do so, particularly if the agreement fails to materially comply with the objectives of the governing legislation, could well result in the agreement being set aside.

The circumstances of this case move us to consider the implications flowing from Miglin for the deliberate failure of a spouse to provide all the relevant financial information in negotiations for the division of assets. In my view, it is a corollary to the realities addressed by this court in Miglin that there be a duty to make full and honest disclosure of such information when negotiating separation agreements.

The husband’s exploitative conduct, both in failing to make full and honest disclosure and in taking advantage of what he knew to be his wife’s mental instability, resulted in a finding of unconscionability. The trial judge accordingly ordered that the wife be compensated in an amount representing the difference between her negotiated equalization payment and her entitlement under British Columbia’s Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128. On the facts and law, I see no reason to disturb his conclusion.”

Spouses need to approach the settlement negotiations frankly and ensure the opposing party gets independent legal advice. Home made agreements are unlikely to protect either side and a little money and effort spent doing it right the first time will ensure savings on expensive legal fees after the fact.

Lorne MacLean

MacLean Family Law Group Layers and Articled Students


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