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Archive for the ‘Divorce Planning’ Category

BC FAMILY ASSET and BC PROPERTY DIVISION- NEW BC FAMILY LAW RULES ALLOW INTERIM ADVANCES FOR BC LEGAL FEES AND EXPERT REPORTS

Sunday, July 11th, 2010

BC Family Law and Interim Distribution of BC Family Assets and Advances to Pay BC Legal Fees: Who Pays the Piper in Divorce?

We are all familiar with the notion that “he who pays the piper calls the tune,” but what happens when you don’t have the money to pay the piper? In contested divorce cases it is not uncommon for legal fees and expenses to reach the point where you face difficulty paying your lawyer to represent your interests for lack of funds. In cases of mid to high net worth divorcing couples there are usually substantial assets that require dividing – bank accounts, trust/income funds, houses, property (local and foreign) and insurance policies to name but a few. Assets by their very nature have an intrinsic monetary value. The question is whether or not a divorcing spouse short on capital before a trial needed to pay their legal fees can access these assets or borrow against them to pay past, present and future legal expenses before the trial that will likely divide these family assets- most often equally? Is there any reason that all assets should remain untouchable until the trial is over and judgment rendered?

A new rule may allow people access to income and assets before a trial where in the past this was more difficult if not impossible to achieve. Lorne MacLean of the MacLean Family Law Group points out new BC Supreme Court Family rule 12-1 may allow a much needed interim advance of funds for a spouse needing funds to live on or to pay legal and expert fees as it states:

Photo Lorne MacLean BC Family Law Attorney

BC Supreme Court Family Law Rule 12-1

Allowance of income from property
(3) If property is the subject matter of a family law case and the court is satisfied that the property will be more than sufficient to answer all claims on it, the court at any time

(a) may allow the whole or part of the income of the property to be paid, during such period as the court may direct, to a party who has an interest in it, or

(b) in the case of personal property, may order that part of the personal property be delivered or transferred to a party.

Recovery of specific property
(4) If a party claims the recovery of specific property other than land, the court may order that the property claimed be given up to the party, pending the outcome of the family law case, either unconditionally or on terms and conditions, if any, relating to giving security, time, mode of trial or otherwise.

In the past a party claiming an advance against their ultimate share in property met with stiff judicial precedent against them.
In British Columbia the leading authority – Ansari v. Ansari [2000] BCJ No. 763 – holds that advances (interim distributions) or borrowing funds against family assets subject to division in a divorce proceeding to pay past, present and future legal fees are not allowed except to fund unusual disbursements relating specifically to the valuation of assets. In Ansari v. Ansari [2000] B.C.J. No. 763 (BCSC) – Macaulay J.noted:

(a) Jurisdiction for interim payment from family assets founded in s.66 of the Family Relations Act (as decided in Erskine v. Erskine (1991) 31 R.F.L. (3d) 273)

(b) Two step test established by Kirkpatrick J. in Jiwa v. Jiwa [1992] B.C.J. No. 3024 (S.C.):

(1) Is the advance required to mount a challenge to the other spouse’s position at trial?

(2) Will the advance or the payment on an interim distribution basis jeopardize the other spouse’s position at trial?

Macaulay J. held at paragraph 28 in Ansari:

As the interim distribution of assets sought relates primarily to past and projected legal expenses in the matrimonial litigation, entitlement falls to be determined, in my view, within s.66 and with regard to the limitations expressed in earlier decisions. The weight of authority is against ordering an interim distribution of assets to meet past and, in particular, future legal expenses except to fund unusual disbursements relating specifically to the valuation of assets. I decline to order an interim distribution in favour of either party.

The more recent case of Herr v. Herr [2006] B.C.J. No. 1624 – held as in Ansari that no interim disposition of funds should be allowed allowed and at paragraphs 19 and 20 Ralph J. stated:

“The purpose for which the true interim distribution was required was not specific but appeared to be for past and future legal expenses. As recognized in Ansari the weight of authority is against ordering an interim distribution of assets to meet past and future legal expenses except to fund unusual disbursements relating to the valuation of assets.”

“In my respectful view, having already authorized a substantial draw upon these funds to pay the arrears of support, the Master erred in further authorizing the payment of $40,000 for the unspecified past and future legal expense. I conclude that Mr. Herr’s appeal with respect to the Master’s order relating to the interim distribution of $40,000 should be allowed and that the order must be set aside.”

Similarly, in Hiemstra v. Hiemstra [2001] B.C.J. No. 522 – No interim distribution of funds was allowed to pay legal fees and in McLeod v. McLeod [2001] B.C.J. No. 1201 (S.C.) – Kirkpatrick J. followed Ansari and refused to make an interim order for distribution of funds for legal fees. Kirkpatrick J. also followed the Pierce decision, in that she did not find that “such an advance is, in equity, required”. The distinguishing features in this case are that the wife was already receiving a substantial sum (close to $5000 per month) for child support and the husband was paying a good portion of the household expenses, and spousal support of almost $4000. Therefore, the circumstances were not so dire as to require the disbursement of funds to the wife out of the property.

An older line of cases did allow some advances for legal fees:

(a) Pierce v. Pierce [1994] B.C.J. No. 3079 (S.C.) as per Melnick J. – the focus in ordering an advance is not whether it is required for one spouse to fund his or her lawsuit against the other, but rather whether, in order to make a determination regarding assets, as contemplated by s.52 of
Family Relations Act, such an advance is, in equity, required.

(b) Ford v. Ford (6 February 1992), Vancouver Registry A913765 – allowed for release of funds for legal fees.

(c) Newbury J. in Lane v. Lane [1991] B.C.J. No. 3246 (S.C.) – lump sum payment ordered to reimburse a wife for past accounting and legal expenses but would not order payment for estimated future legal expenses.

The big change regarding experts in family matters is the emphasis on 1 neutral expert being appointed by consent or if disputed by court order as follows:

Single Court Appointed Expert
13-4
Application to court
(3) If the parties do not agree that a joint expert is required or do not agree on any matter relating to the appointment of a joint expert, any party may apply to the court in accordance with Rule 10-5 for an order
(a) appointing a joint expert, and
(b) settling any matter relating to the appointment of the joint expert.

Note also full cooperation is required and full disclosure mandated under this rule.

Appointment of Court’s own Expert
13-5
(10) The remuneration of an expert appointed under this rule
(a) must be fixed by the court and consented to by the expert, and
(b) may include
(i) a fee for the report, and any supplementary reports, required under Rule 13-6, and
(ii) an appropriate sum for each day that the expert’s attendance in court is required.
Security for remuneration

(11) The court may make one or both of the following orders, without prejudice to any party’s right to costs:
(a) an order directing that the expert’s remuneration be paid by the persons and at the time ordered by the court;
(b) an order for security for the expert’s remuneration

If you have an issue with needing to access monies you are properly owed before trial call us toll free at 1-877-602-9900 to help you ensure your case is handled properly and that funds you need to protect your rights and properly instruct your lawyer and valuation experts can be obtained.

Key Canadian Tax Decision Allows Deduction of Divorce and Family Law Legal Fees Related to BC Child Support

Monday, June 14th, 2010

Lorne MacLean -New Tax Deduction for Legal Fees to Claim BC Child Support

A new Tax Court ruling affecting BC child support legal fee deduction could help you save thousands provided your BC family law counsel is aware of this important development. Come see The BC child support lawyers at MacLean Family Law Group to learn more about how this important ruling affects you. In short a new case has expanded the class of people able to deduct legal fees to claim BC child support.

If you are seeking child support from you former spouse you are entitled to a CRA tax deduction of those legal fees against your income tax payable thanks to Trignani v. The Queen [2010] TCC 209.

In this case, the separating parent’s August 2000 agreement stipulated joint custody for the child and the appellant was to pay child support of $350/month. In May 2001 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ordered that the appellant would have sole interim custody of the child with the spouse having interim access 50 percent of the time with supervision. And, the appellant was to continue to pay $350/month in child support.

For the majority of the time the appellant had physical custody of the child because appropriate supervision at the spouse’s residence was not available.

The Honourable Justice Judith Woods in her decision dated April 9, 2010 notes that as long as the person seeking, or pursuing child support against the other parent does not abandon their claim for child support before the relevant legal services were provided; and, that it has not been determined by a court that you do not have a pre-existing right to child support because that right was extinguished by a court order, then you are entitled to the deduction in computing your income.

It has generally been accepted that legal expenses incurred to obtain child support are deductible in computing income: Wakeman v. The Queen, [1996] 3 CTC 2585; McColl v. The Queen, 2000 DTC 2148; Sabour v. The Queen, [2002] 1 CTC 2585 (in obiter at para 9); and Rabb v. The Queen, [2006] 3 CTC 2266. This principle is also accepted by the Canada Revenue Agency, as evidenced by Interpretation Bulletin IT-99R5, at para 17.

With respect to child support, legal expenses have been considered to be on current account on the basis that there is a pre-existing right by virtue of a legislative obligation on each parent to support their children.

A note of caution must be raised: The person seeking child support or pursuing a claim for child support must be making a bona fide claim that is not frivolous, and must have a reasonable prospect of success. You will also need to have your lawyer keep track what portion of fees related to child custody and get a letter from them that sets out the correct amount.

BC Law on Varying or Setting Aside Unfair BC Separation Agreements or BC Marriage Agreements 2010 Update

Sunday, April 25th, 2010

We are often asked to review BC separation agreement or BC marriage agreements with a view to setting the BC separation or BC Marriage agreement aside and Shelagh Kinney of our BC Family Law office had a nice win recently in a case on behalf of the wife in L v. L, a BC Supreme Court separation agreement variation 2010 decision.

Our Supreme Court in the Brandsema decision warned spouses that fair agreements made with full disclosure between spouses on an equal footing will be protected but unfair exploitive agreements will not be sanctioned. In Brandsema the Court focussed on non-disclosure by the husband and varied the agreement to give the wife more money on the following basis:

Abella J., speaking for the majority, stated (at paras. 1–6):

“This court has frequently recognized that negotiations following the disintegration of a spousal relationship take place in a uniquely difficult context. The reality of this singularly emotional negotiating environment means that special care must be taken to ensure that, to the extent possible, the assets of the former relationship are distributed through negotiations that are free from informational and psychological exploitation.

This appeal, therefore, attracts a spotlight to the duties owed by separating spouses during the process of negotiating and executing a separation agreement for the division of matrimonial assets. In Miglin, based on the inherent vulnerability of spouses during negotiations, this Court stated that in order to safeguard a separation agreement from judicial intervention, a spouse must refrain from using exploitative tactics. It held that the failure to do so, particularly if the agreement fails to materially comply with the objectives of the governing legislation, could well result in the agreement being set aside.

The circumstances of this case move us to consider the implications flowing from Miglin for the deliberate failure of a spouse to provide all the relevant financial information in negotiations for the division of assets. In my view, it is a corollary to the realities addressed by this court in Miglin that there be a duty to make full and honest disclosure of such information when negotiating separation agreements.

The husband’s exploitative conduct, both in failing to make full and honest disclosure and in taking advantage of what he knew to be his wife’s mental instability, resulted in a finding of unconscionability. The trial judge accordingly ordered that the wife be compensated in an amount representing the difference between her negotiated equalization payment and her entitlement under British Columbia’s Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128. On the facts and law, I see no reason to disturb his conclusion.”

Spouses need to approach the settlement negotiations frankly and ensure the opposing party gets independent legal advice. Home made agreements are unlikely to protect either side and a little money and effort spent doing it right the first time will ensure savings on expensive legal fees after the fact.

Lorne MacLean

MacLean Family Law Group Layers and Articled Students

MacLean Family Law Group Wins BC Shared Custody for Father

Friday, April 23rd, 2010

Lorne MacLean, Partner MacLean Family Law Group

Lorne MacLean is currently involved in a BC Shared Custody case and he is relying on a case he won for a father a few years ago which BC shared custody and guardianship case accepted MacLean’s arguments and ordered week on week off shared custody as follows:

1. In O.T.H. v. S.L.H. 2003 BCSC 1399, a mother appealed an order of a Master awarding joint custody and equal parenting time for the parties’ child, which was a change in the status quo for the Child since the parties separated. Rogers J. dismissed the appeal and held that the Master had not erred in altering the status quo. At paragraphs 28 & 29 of the decision, Rogers J. held that:

It cannot, as Mrs. H. suggests, be the case that simply because the status quo has pertained for, say, a year and a half, that it must ipso facto serve the child’s best interests. That is, in my view, extremely faulty reasoning. One does not, just because the child has had his primary residence with one parent for a year, conclude that that arrangement is in that child’s best interests. That arrangement may, in fact, have been contrary to the child’s best interests from the outset. It is for the court on an application to upset the status quo to determine where the child’s best interests lie. This is, I believe, one of the bedrock principles of family law. See, for example, Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 and Robinson v. Fylik, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2519.
I do not think that the learned Master fell into error by proceeding on an assumption or some preconceived idea that shared residency is the default position and that it was for either Mr. or Mrs. H. to show that it should not pertain. The learned Master’s reasons clearly indicate that as he considered Mr. H.’s application for shared residency he took into account the fact that for the most part the children had been with their mother since separation and that they were now expressing a desire for more time with their dad. His reasons also indicate that he considered the parents’ own wishes in that regard and whether shared residency would unduly upset the children. The learned Master made reference to Mrs. H.’s agreement that, at least in the summertime, there should be shared residency. I have no doubt that the learned Master considered, as well, the principal of maximum contact between child and parent mandated by s. 16(10) of the Divorce Act R.S., 1985, c. 3. The learned Master took into consideration the children’s circumstances before the application, concluded that shared residency would better serve those interests, and made his order accordingly.

WINNING BC SHARED CHILD CUSTODY ARGUMENTS

Wednesday, April 21st, 2010


I just appeared in New Westminster Supreme Court today and argued a BC shared child custody case and cited some of these shared child custody concepts which are applicable to a wide variety of cases involving disputed BC child custody ( I will report back on the results of the case and provide more shared custody tips shortly):

BENEFITS OF SHARED CUSTODY

• It ensures continuation of family life for the child, with the advantage of nurture from both parents rather than just one.
• It reassures the child that he has two parents, and although they live in separate places, the child definitely has a home with both of them.
• It dispels the notion that only one parent is “caring” and that the other is “errant” or “absent”.
• It ensures that one parent is not unfairly burdened with the responsibility of discipline whilst the other is relegated to (or marginalized as) the fun or mere access parent.
• It provides the opportunity for children and parents to develop meaningful and lasting relationships – in place of the artificiality and frustrations of mere access.
• It affirms the parents in their belief that they both have an ongoing role in their child’s life.
• It places both parents on an equal footing with schools, doctors and the world at large – who might otherwise only want to deal with the custodial parent.
• It confirms that no matter what, each parent wants to, and is able to, provide a home for their child.
• It reassures the child that in the event of one parent dying they still have a home to go to.
• Without such an order, if one parent dies, the child would not automatically go to live with the other parent, but would be left with whoever they were living with at the time or handed over to a guardian – a poor substitute for a natural parent.
• It enables both parents to claim the additional personal tax allowance (and possibly one parent benefit, family credit and additional child benefit), thus increasing the income available to the children (only applicable for two or more children).

I believe that children should not have to forfeit the love and guidance of two caring and concerned parents merely because marriage breakdown has occurred. Please call us at 1-877-602-9900 if you have a disputed custody case and watch our videos on a variety of topics.

Adultery and Misconduct in BC Divorce and British Columbia Separation

Monday, April 19th, 2010

Lorne MacLean- Divorce Lawyer- brings a Fresh Perspective to Your Case


Many BC divorce and British Columbia Separated parents involved in a BC child custody case think their chances of receiving child custody, more or less support, or a larger share of the family property will change if their spouse has had an affair.

In reality an affair has little if any impact on the issues surrounding marriage breakdown. In the infamous case of Leskun we acted for husband who had had an affair and we were successful in the Supreme Court of Canada in upholding the principle that a spouse’s affair was irrelevant to the issues of spousal support unless it could be proven, supported by medical evidence, that the affair had a negative financial impact the other spouse that prevented them from earning what they normally would have earned. The ability of one spouse to sue the other spouse or mistress for damages for an affair or for “alienation of affection” was long ago abolished in British Columbia. While there still is the ability to sue for damages for physical and mental abuse in British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada has narrowed the scope of this claim in their decision of Frame v. Smith.

We warn our spouses that a new relationship during the end of a shaky marriage or immediately after the marriage has broken down can negatively impact a child custody claim if it is shown that the new person is introduced too soon into a relationship or that the new relationship distracts the separating spouse from focusing on their children and putting their children’s interests ahead of their own. A new relationship can also impact and reduce a receiving spouse’s claim for support under some circumstances. We want people to go slow as it is imperative people do not “jump from the frying pan into the fire”.The existence of a new relationship often will not help promote a quick settlement so this is a critical factor to consider as well!

Some people argue that Canada should return to the old fault days of divorce where misconduct resulted in negative consequences to the offending spouse. As an example of what might happen if Canada were to return to the antediluvian days of fault we point to the recent decision in United States below.

Wife’s $9m victory in adultery case warns mistresses to ‘lay off’: Cynthia Shackelford, 60, was awarded the unprecedented sum by a jury in the United States for damages to her feelings under an obscure 19th century adultery law; North Carolina is one of seven states in America where the so-called “alienation of affection” law is still in force. It evolved from common law under which women were classes as property of their husbands. As property, they were something that could be stolen. The award was made against Anne Lundquist, 49, an administrator at a private school, who was accused of having an affair with Allan Shackelford, a 62 year-old lawyer who had been married to Mrs. Shackelford for 33 years. The jury awarded her $5 million compensation and also awarded $4 million in punitive damages to be paid by Miss Lundquist. Miss Lundquist, who is now the dean of students at Wells College, in Aurora, New York, did not attend the court hearing and said she had not even been told it was happening. She is appealing. She said: “I’m so caught off guard by everything. I don’t have a lot of money, so where this $9 million comes from is kind of hysterical.” “My main message is to all those women out there who might have their eyes on some guy that is married to not come between anybody,” Ms. Shackelford told “Good Morning America”. “I wanted other people to understand, before they do it, how much it hurts.” Lee Rosen, of the Rosen Law Firm in North Carolina, said the state has around 200 “alienation of affection” claims a year. He said: “If your spouse is going to cheat, you really would like them to cheat with somebody who has a lot of money.”
As reported in:
Coffee Break – North, Fort St. John, Vol. 1.23 March 27-April 4, 2010

What Family Property is Shared when we Divorce? BC Family Assets Defined

Friday, April 9th, 2010

When you divorce BC family asset property like the “Wedding Van” above can be divided, most often equally, if they fit the following criteria in one or more of the following ways:

1.s. 58(2)— BC family asset property ordinarily used for a family purpose;

2.s. 58(3)(e)—a venture which fits the BC family asset definition to which the spouse has directly or indirectly contributed; and

3.s. 59—property used primarily for a business towards which a direct or indirect contribution was made by the other spouse to the operation of the business which makes it a divisible BC family asset.

The British Columbia legislation is broad and will capture most property in a marriage but not all. The onus is one the spouse alleging it is not a family asset to prove it is outside the scope of the above factors.

Call us if you have questions on what assets are or are not to be divided upon marriage breakdown. Note different rules apply to unmarried spouses.

BC Separation Law for Divorcing and Separating Common Law and Unmarried Spouses

Thursday, April 8th, 2010

Lorne MacLean Vancouver BC Family Lawyer


We as British Columbia family law and BC divorce lawyers as well as lawyers acting for unmarried couples are often asked to explain the differences in law that applies to divorcing as opposed to separating unmarried couples.

There are several differences between the legal rights of individuals separating from a marriage versus those that are separating from a Common Law relationship. In this article a very brief synopsis of some of the most significant differences will be highlighted. Please note that this should not to be considered as legal advice that is necessarily relevant to your own situation. Should you be considering a separation or are in the midst of a separation we urge you to seek legal advice as soon as possible.

In British Columbia you must cohabit 2 years in a marriage-like relationship before you are considered as being in a common law relationship. If the common law nature of a a relationship is disputed by one party, the Court will embark on a consideration of all factors regarding the relationship to establish whether it fits under this definition. The facts considered will include but not limited to the sexual involvement of the couple, their economic codependence, roles played by each party (ie. homemaker and breadwinner) and whether there are any children borne of the relationship.

1. Property

When married couples separate, no matter how long the marriage, pursuant to section 56 if the Family Relations Act the parties have a presumptive one-half interest in all family property. While under section 65 of the Family Relations Act one or both separating couples may request a reapportionment of assets in their favour, the fact is that the Courts must be persuaded to depart from the presumptive equal splitting of property. This means that with married couples, upon separation property division is somewhat simplified in quantum percentage save for the rare time when there is evidence to suggest that it would be unfair to proceed with the equal division.

All of the assets, property and debt in a marriage are presumed to be family assets and up for division. A party must demonstrate that the exclusion of an asset, property or debt in the division (or reapportionment) is appropriate or else it will be thrown into the pot for consideration.

Conversely, when common law couples separate, there is no presumptive equal split of family assets. As a matter of fact, there are no “family” assets per say, but rather a bundle of assets or property in one or both parties’ names which must be plodded through to determine the quantum of ownership that is appropriate in a given situation. One (or both) parties must claim their stake in the assets or property by arguing that the other party has been unjustly enriched by their own contribution. In basic terms, what needs to be established is that one spouse has been enriched, there is a corresponding deprivation to the other spouse, and there is no legal reason for the enrichment.

This argument can attach to all sorts of assets or property, including but not limited to real property (ie. land and home), vehicles, RRSP’s, pensions and bank accounts.

In common law separations the equitable relief of quantum meruit is generally sought alongside unjust enrichment and roughly translates from Latin as “reasonable value of services”. The approach when arguing this relief usually takes the form of establishing the fair market price for such services as housekeeping services, cooking and child rearing, which in some cases can be attached to the trust claim for unjust enrichment as a means of strengthening it or used in the alternative to such a claim (ie. 10 years at $2000 a month average services rendered established and then this claim settled by a portion of the proceeds of sale of the home).

What is disturbing to many common law parties who apply to Court to enforce their legal rights is that unlike married couples, they may have to first prove the common law nature of their relationship (using the factors listed above) and then they must prove their contribution to assets and property which they always were assured of or assumed they had an equal share in. The Court process may include providing proof from a non-title party to a home of the following services rendered when it comes to the home: gardening services, renovations undertaken, money invested and maintenance services. It can get as tedious as reviewing bills for renovation supplies to see who paid them and having 3rd parties testify to who they saw sweeping the deck and clearing the bushes every Saturday and also what might be charged for such services.

2. Spousal Support

As mentioned above, a common-law partnership is only established in British Columbia after 2 years of a marriage-like relationship. It is only after this two-year mark that upon separation one party can claim spousal support from the other. It is important to note that unlike in marriages, the decision to seek relief of spousal support in Court must be made within 1 year of separation. There is no such deadline upon marriage separation nor is there a minimum length of marriage before one party can receive spousal support from the other. In theory, while rare, a party that was only married for a few months and did not cohabit prior to marriage can request and receive spousal support from the other.

The amount and length that one party receives spousal support from the other is determined in identical fashion in the breakdown of common law relationships and marriages.

3. Child Support

There are no significant differences in basic child support received by parties who were in common law relationships versus those in marriage. The amount and length are determined in identical fashion in the breakdown of common law relationships and marriages.

4. Custody and Access

There are no differences between the manner in which these issues are determined in common law relationships versus those in marriages. The determining factor is the best interests of the child(ren).

BC DIVORCE AND VANCOUVER FAMILY LAW LAWYERS MANAGING PARTNER LORNE MACLEAN AND ASSOCIATE JUSTIN WERB

Wednesday, February 3rd, 2010

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SMART BC DIVORCE TIPS # 6 WINNING BC SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND BC SPOUSAL SUPPORT ADVISORY GUIDELINES VIDEO RELEASED

Wednesday, February 3rd, 2010

BC Spousal Support and the applicability of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines for separated spouses is a complex and highly contentious area. Lorne MacLean BC Family Law and BC Divorce Lawyer provides crucial tips to help you avoid common BC spousal support and BC Spousal Support Advisory Guideline mistakes. Do not waive BC spousal support and maintenance or fail to consider the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines on quantum and duration of support, on the with and without child support formula, on attributed income in disputed spousal support cases, on shared and split custody and on what happens when one party remarries or repartners.

WATCH THE WINNING BC SPOUSAL SUPPORT VIDEO BY CLICKING HERE